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I first met Stephanie Shields at the meetings of the Society for Experimental Social 
Psychology in 1998. I was in the midst of PhD research in social psychology, but it 
was also becoming clear to me that I had emerging interests in the history of 
psychology. In my early career, Stephanie was my existence proof that you could 
work on gender, do original historical work, and be an experimental social 
psychologist.  (And be welcoming and encouraging to junior colleagues at major 
conferences). This retrospective allows me to repay debts I owe to her for support and 
inspiration, and I will try to do that by arguing for the continued relevance of Shields 
(1975) for 21st century times.  
By attending to the ‘mythical’ functions of science, Shields (1975) used 
history to develop a productive critique.  She described theories of gender differences 
that justified systemic inequalities between the sexes which had drawn on dubious 
evidence about what women and men do to reach yet-more dubious conclusions about 
what women and men can do and ought to do. Brain anatomy studies, theories about 
statistical variation, and ideas about inborn instincts were all held to account in this 
manner. Shields’ final sentence leaves it to the reader to draw the final conclusions 
about the lessons of the past for the present:  
That science played handmaiden to social values cannot be denied.  Whether a 
parallel situation exists in today’s study of sex differences is open to question 
(Shields, 1975, p. 753). 
Discerning readers might have guessed how the author would answer her own 
question.  
Shield’s argument was more than timely. She anticipated the kinds of myths 
that would give the psychology of gender its form in the decades that would follow.  
Claims about sexually dimorphic brains were at the centre of debates about feminist 
theories of biology that emerged in the 1980s (Swaab & Fliers, 1985).  When 
Stephanie and I first met at that conference during ‘the decade of the brain,’ I had 
recently published my first article, in this journal, which critiqued the science of  ‘gay 
brains’ – an offshoot of attempts to locate sex differences in the brain (Author, 1997). 
Contemporary feminist work on ‘brain gender’ theories which essentialize the effects 
of fetal hormonal levels on later adult psychology (e.g., Jordan-Young, 2010) and on 
the different forms of sociality that are naturalized in different accounts of the mirror 
neuron system (Pitts-Taylor, 2013) continue critical engagement with neuroscience.  
This work is vital because brain myths have come to compete with mind myths to a 
far greater extent for the attention of funders and policy makers (Rose & Abi-Rachad, 
2013).  Shields (1975) alanysis of how contradictory findings about brain size were 
used by different authors to refiy sexism in the 19th century remains more relevant 
now than when she penned it in the 1970s.   
Shields’ (1975) analysis of the variability hypothesis similarly deserves more 
attention among critical scholars than it has enjoyed in the last forty years.  Also in 
1975, Michel Foucault also published Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison, 
translated into English as Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison (Foucualt, 
1975/1995).  This genealogy of justice narrates the rise of ‘disciplinary power’ and 
the psy-disciplines as the morality of justice shifts away from the just exercise of 
sovereign power toward the benevolent and rationalized exercise of power in the 
service of disciplining the mind and rehabilitating the conscience. As accounts of 
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power/knowledge in early psychology, Stephanie Shields’ and Michel Foucault’s 
writings from 1975 are at odds in one important respect.  Foucault emphasized how 
disciplinary power targeted abnormal behavior and individuals, and sought to 
normalize both to ensure the smooth running of institutions. In such a system of 
power, variation from the norm becomes visible and subject to correction and 
discipline.  On the other hand, Shield’s emphasis on the variability hypothesis 
exemplifies how Darwinian thinking made variability and atypicality potentially 
valued attributes of individuals and groups, and contributed to the making of different 
kinds of myths.  Whilst early 19th century definitions of the normal had considered 
extreme variation a worrying sign of social instability, Darwinian theory allowed 
extreme cases to be understood as evidence of particular fitness, and the raw material 
upon which evolutionary processes operated i (see also Hacking, 1990). The 
variability hypothesis created continuity between Darwinian psychologizing and the 
IQ testing movement in early American psychology. As Shields (1982) detailed 
elsewhere, it became both a matter of repeated disagreement between women and 
men psychologists in that movement and repeatedly mired in debates about the 
measurement of variability.  The Foucaultian notion of ‘disciplinary power’ leads us 
to assume that atypicality becomes visualized and targeted by power/knowledge in 
psychological disciplines. The variability hypothesis shows us that atpyicality can 
also be a resource for constructing system justifying myths about dominant groups 
such as men.    
The variability hypothesis justified more than gender inequalities.  White 
Darwinian scientists imagined sex differences to be larger in their own ‘racial’ group 
than among the people they colonized, using sex differences as a measure of 
civilization and progress.  Accordingly, gender similarities among non-White people 
were understood as signs of primitivism and informed the denigration of gender 
inversion among homosexuals (Somerville, 2000).  Elsewhere, I have argued that 
psychological differences among men that were understood to signify sexual 
differences were often normalized in the conservative mode of disciplinary power 
described by Foucault. However differences understood to signify intellectual 
differences were increasingly understood through a different framework of 
normativity in which exceptionality was often valued as the optimistic hope for a 
better future. But that’s another story (Author, 2013).  
Finally, Shields’ critical attention to maternal instinct theories in 
Functionalism was also on the mark. In the mid-1970s Darwinian reasoning returned 
to psychology after a hiatus of theorizing about instincts, and it often suggested 
natural immutable limits on the possibilities of gender equality (e.g., Dawkins, 1975). 
In recent decades, tensions between feminist and Darwinian approaches in 
psychology have often overstated the ‘scientific’ nature of evolutionary psychology 
and the ‘political’ nature of feminism. It is the rare psychologist, who draws on both 
traditions, and who sees through this uneven construction.  A case in point is Felicia 
Pratto (1999), who critiqued evolutionary psychology’s claims to be less political than 
feminist psychology, noting that “Steering clear of researching political topics might 
seem to be more scientific and less political, but in fact it is equally political and less 
scientific because it obscures power differences.”  
In recent work, Natasha Bharj and I materialized experimental evidence for 
the political nature of analogies in evolutionary thinking, drawing on postcolonial 
feminism to make one operation of power in evolutionary thinking more visible. The 
term ‘harem’ is derived from European mis-recognition of Arab societies during the 
period of colonial expansion considered by Shields (Ahmed, 1992). The term became 
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an analogy for certain kinds of animal societies among scientists from colonizing 
nations in the 1930s, and the use of this analogy became more frequent and far 
ranging in psychologists’ evolutionary thinking from the 1970s onward. Research on 
historical cognition shows that people often confuse historical analogies with 
historical facts. For example, when presented with analogies between the prohibition 
era and contemporary drug laws, people commonly misremember analogies drawn 
from the prohibition era as facts that they have learned about contemporary drug laws 
(Blanchette & Dunbar, 2002; see also Perrot, Gentner, & Bodenhausen, 2005).  Bharj 
and I (in press) demonstrated a similar effect of reasoning about animal harems. 
When we presented participants with descriptions of animal societies, described as 
‘harems’ accompanied by colonial analogies, participants mis-remembered the claims 
about Middle Eastern human societies as scientific claims about animal societies.  
This study supports the point that evolutionary thinking draws on metaphors drawn 
from very particular human societies to structure particular understandings of the 
nature of animal behavior.  Such work goes beyond the illusion of neutrality 
described by Pratto (1999).  Of course, our work was also informed both by Stephanie 
Shileds more recent thinking about the Darwinian influence on psychology and the 
need for intersectionality (Shields, 2008; Shields & Bhatia,2009).    
In closing I want to emphasize that Stephanie Shields’ diverse research work 
and its impact has demonstrated very particularly how critical historicist attention to 
the mythic functions of psychology is not incompatible with the doing of empirical 
work in psychology.  In other areas of my work, I have tried to engage with 
substantive problems using multiple approaches.  In addition to discursive work on 
gay brains, I have also been engaged in experimental work demonstrating anti-gay 
motives behind some heterosexual men’s endorsement of the biological theory of 
sexuality (Author, 2014). Sapphira Thorne, Caroline Catmur and I have examined the 
lateralized brain to generate new evidence suggesting that androcentric language leads 
to androcentric visual processing (Thorne, Author, & Catmur, in press).  Susanne 
Bruckmüller and I have examined how explanatory attention adheres to lower status 
groups – as Foucault’s model of disciplinary power suggests it would – and that such 
explanations have clear consequences of for beliefs about those groups’ power 
(Author & Bruckmüller, 2013). As imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, I will 
close by saying that some of us have been led by Stephanie’s work to recognize ‘that 
science played handmaiden to social values cannot be denied.’  Whether a parallel 
situation exists in today’s study of sex differences (and whether we can do feminist 
science differently in the 21st century) is open to question. 
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